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Disease in U.S. animal livestock industries annually costs over a billion dollars. Adoption
and compliance with biosecurity practices is necessary to successfully reduce the risk
of disease introduction or spread. Yet, a variety of human behaviors, such as the
urge to minimize time costs, may induce non-compliance with biosecurity practices.
Utilizing a “serious gaming” approach, we examine how information about infection risk
impacts compliance with biosecurity practices. We sought to understand how simulated
environments affected compliance behavior with treatments that varied using three
factors: (1) the risk of acquiring an infection, (2) the delivery method of the infection
risk message (numerical, linguistic and graphical), and (3) the certainty of the infection
risk information. Here we show that compliance is influenced by message delivery
methodology, with numeric, linguistic, and graphical messages showing increasing
efficacy, respectively. Moreover, increased situational uncertainty and increased risk were
correlated with increases in compliance behavior. These results provide insight toward
developing messages that are more effective and provide tools that will allow managers
of livestock facilities and policy makers to nudge behavior toward more disease resilient
systems via greater compliance with biosecurity practices.
Keywords: biosecurity, compliance, risk, uncertainty, graphical message, linguistic phrase, numeric message,
psychological distance
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INTRODUCTION
Livestock diseases threaten animal welfare and livelihoods
throughout production networks. Yet, due to the continued
consolidation of livestock production (1, 2), increased
movements of animals (3), and globalization of trade within
livestock industries (4), disease prevalence is growing. For
example, Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea virus (PEDv) was first
detected in the U.S. in 2013 and within 12 months this disease
had spread to 33 states. Nearly half of hog facilities have
experienced a PEDv outbreak since its introduction (5) with
net annual economic welfare reductions initially estimated at
between $900 million to $1.8 billion (6). Many industry experts
agree that implementing biosecurity practices is key to reducing
the social and economic impacts of livestock diseases to industry
stakeholder and consumers of hog products (7, 8), yet investment
in biosecurity is low (9–11). Finding innovative and cost-effective
ways to motivate, or nudge, farms to implement and comply with
biosecurity practices will be instrumental in protecting livestock
herds from endemic, exotic, and emerging diseases.
Biosecurity implementation at livestock facilities is both
a tactical decision, with facility managers deciding which
preventive biosecurity practices to adopt, as well as a series
of ongoing operational decisions, with personnel deciding to
comply or not comply with biosecurity practices (12). Regular
compliance with biosecurity practices can significantly reduce
disease. Unfortunately, many behaviors and signals in the work
environment can negatively affect compliance. Behaviors such
as habits, complacency, and the urge to minimize expenditures
of time may induce non-compliance with biosecurity practices.
For example, Beloeil et al. (13) found that consistently changing
clothes before entering a hog facility reduced Salmonella
seropositive animals from 87 to 13%. Yet studies have shown
consistency in compliance with these practices is rarely the
case (14). Racicot et al. (15), using hidden cameras, found 44
different biosecurity lapses made by workers and visitors at
Quebec poultry farms over the course of 4 weeks, with the
average number of biosecurity breaches being four per visit (15).
The factors involved in this human behavioral dimension of
biosecurity implementation are not well-known, but are thought
to be essential to biosecurity practices and livestock welfare (16).
In this study we examine factors that may influence perception
of disease risk and thus, compliance with biosecurity practices
associated with production facilities. Variables to be treated in
this study include: information regarding disease infection risk,
amount of uncertainty associated with the information provided
about the disease infection risk, and the types of message delivery
methods used to communicate disease infection risk. These
factors have been identified as influencing biosecurity in a variety
of livestock systems (8, 17). Risk of disease is ubiquitous in
livestock production facilities, but the level of risk at any given
time is generally not known since it is challenging to quantify, and
the sharing of information about disease prevalence and location
is not standard procedure. Risk tolerance is generally high among
U.S. farmers (18), but as the actual risk of disease infection is
perceived to increase, farmers may be more apt to implement
biosecurity or comply with biosecurity protocols (8, 19–21).
The degree of certainty provided in the infection risk message
is also expected to affect biosecurity compliance. Ritter et al.
(8) suggested that as certainty about disease information is
enhanced (and uncertainty reduced), the benefits of practicing
biosecurity are presented with greater certainty (19) or salience
(22). This could lead to increased biosecurity implementation.
Indeed, Merrill et al. (21) found, in an experimental simulation
of disease in a swine production region, that a decrease in
uncertainty (e.g., increase in certainty) about disease in a
simulated swine production systemwas associated with increased
tactical investments in biosecurity.
In addition to infection risk certainty, another important
factor may be the perceived reliability of the information,
which may vary depending on who is delivering it, consistency
of messaging, and the mode of delivery (8, 16). Farmers
in Ireland, for instance, received different information from
veterinary practitioners vs. dairy advisors, and this perceived
inconsistency or unreliability was stated as the primary reason
for not implementing biosecurity, even while 83% of the farmers
surveyed stated they would adopt practices if that would result in
better herd health (23).
Another factor affecting compliance with biosecurity practices
is the types of messages that workers at production facilities
receive about disease, including the message delivery format.
Evidence suggests that using impactful imagery should be more
effective than using a number or phrase to convey messages
(24). For example, since 1974 the U.S. government has used a
rating system with five levels to inform people about the risk of
wildland fires on public lands1 They convey this rating system
using a threat gauge with an arrow pointing to a colored wedge
of half of a wheel, with wedges labeled from “Low” to “Extreme”
and colored green to red, respectively. This imagery effectively
imparts the risk of a forest fire given the current environmental
conditions, and evidence suggests that their use of a threat gauge
is more likely to reduce dangerous fire behavior than simply using
a phrase “Low” to “Extreme” or using some numerical equivalent.
Thus, information delivery may be formatted to maximize
reception and nudge workers toward greater compliance (22).
Here, we examine the use of numbers (percentages), linguistic
phrases (e.g., “Low Infection Risk”), and graphical imagery to
pass information about the risk that the participant’s behavior
could result in their animals becoming infected with a disease.
Because humans frequently use mental shortcuts, or heuristics,
to calculate costs associated with risks, the way the message
about infection risk is delivered impacts their decisions (25, 26).
By design these shortcuts are quick and are largely based on
experience, but they have the capacity to misinform because
they perform poorly when experience is lacking, rely on affect
or feelings, and do not rely on the heavy use of analytical
reasoning (27).
Finally, economic factors and experience with disease likely
play critical roles in biosecurity implementation decisions.
Biosecurity adoption or compliance may be economically
constrained in either direct costs, because biosecurity
investments can be quite costly, or in indirect costs, such
1https://www.nps.gov/articles/understanding-fire-danger.htm
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as opportunity costs, where time pressure has been cited as
a major factor leading to lapses in biosecurity practices (28).
Evidence suggests that recent experience with a disease outbreak
will temporarily increase biosecurity practices (29), although
increased biosecurity effort is not ubiquitous (30).
Understanding of decision-making processes has long been
gained using economic experiments in controlled environments.
Because these experiments are used to gather data, and frequently
are couched with the idea of optimizing payouts, they broadly
may be defined as serious games—games designed not for
enjoyment but rather to gather data or for non-entertainment
purposes such as education. While not always labeled as serious
games, experimental economic games were pioneered in the
work of Nobel Laureate Vernon L. Smith (31, 32) and multiple
price list experiments (33, 34). More recently, experiments run
on computers and as video games have become increasingly
popular across disciplines, including adolescent risk behaviors
(35), cognitive ability enhancement (36), and conflict resolution
(37). The highly controlled environment within a computer
game allows for testing of behavioral differences between,
for example, genders (38) and among populations (39) or
how individuals behave with increased informational awareness
(21). Carefully constructed games provide insight into players’
strategic, tactical, and mechanical decisions (40). Importantly,
results from experimental computer games have been shown to
mirror those from more traditional research instruments such
as surveys [e.g., (35)] and, in some cases, games bring about
better learning and retention than more traditional teaching
methods [e.g., face-to-face, classroom settings or lectures; (41)].
Moreover, serious games offer the possibility of performance-
based incentives. Performance-based incentives are used to make
experiments more salient and increase effort in the decision
making process, over more traditional information gathering
techniques, such as surveys (42). As with many other serious
game experiments (33, 35, 39), one of the primary sources of
study participants was the university community.
Here we developed serious games to simulate a conflict where
participants were confronted with a decision about avoidance
or compliance with a common biosecurity practice: a “line of
separation” at which workers shower and change clothing before
entering or exiting areas with livestock. This line of separation
is considered highly effective for reducing the risk of disease
infection (7, 43). Use of a shower facility, however, carries
opportunity costs associated with the time needed for its use,
which can result in workers electing to bypass or only partially
implement the practice.
We used various experimental scenarios to test participants’
willingness to comply with the line of separation shower facility
and incur associated opportunity costs in order to avoid potential
direct costs associated with infected animals. Treatments varied
the following factors: (1) the risk of acquiring an infection
in their animals; (2) the certainty/uncertainty of the risk of
infection by noting that the infection risk information provided
as either a known value or a value that was uncertain; and
(3) how the infection risk message was delivered, either with a
linguistic phrase (Linguistic), a graphical threat gauge style image
(Graphical) or a numerical (Numerical) value. We hypothesized
(H1) that participants would become more compliant, and
avoid risk as the infection risk increased (33, 44). Additionally,
with increased uncertainty associated with the infection risk
information, we hypothesized (H2) that we would see more
compliance. Finally, we hypothesized (H3) that we would observe
the highest compliance rates with infection risk information
delivered using a graphical method, then using a linguistic phrase
and finally the lowest compliance with infection risk messages
delivered using a numeric value.
In addition to the three primary drivers noted above,
we looked for secondary behavioral drivers. We posited
that participants may immediately react to the economic
consequences that result from their animals becoming infected
by becoming more prone to comply with the shower facility
biosecurity practice, but the tendency toward compliance may
diminish with increasing time since the event (44–46). This
effect is sometimes referred to as psychological distancing,
hyperbolic discounting, or temporal discounting; here we refer
to it as a psychological distance effect. We hypothesize (H4)
that compliance would decrease with increased time since
experiencing an infection.
METHODS
During early phases of this project, research team members
met with biosecurity leaders to better understand how farm
managers and farm workers make tactical and operational
biosecurity decisions and discussed the biosecurity challenges
faced by the industry. One outcome of these meetings was an
increased awareness that compliance with biosecurity protocols
was a serious problem. To study how decisions were made
in the domain of biosecurity compliance, we developed two
serious games that helped us capture the operational compliance
dimensions of livestock biosecurity systems.
Recruitment
We conducted two experiments using serious games to examine
behavioral responses to variations in risk messaging. Experiment
One was performed entirely at facilities on the University of
Vermont campus. Experiment One participants were recruited
using Craigslist, University listservs, direct emails, posters,
and word of mouth. Approximately, 45% of recruits in
Experiment Two were recruited as in Experiment One and
through on-campus workshops, and ∼55% were recruited
through the online workplace Amazon Mechanical Turks (47).
The research team recruited participants from the general
public that were at least 18 years old. Because much of
the participation was on the University of Vermont campus,
many participants were graduate or undergraduate students
(see limitations section Limitations). Recruits were told that
they would be paid based on their performance during the
experiment. Prior to beginning the experiments, participants
were shown an informational slideshow that explained the
purpose of the study. They were then shown a demonstration
of the serious game, which was followed by a screen that
gave them the choice to either proceed to game play, or
exit and not participate. Institutional Review Board protocols
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FIGURE 1 | Screen view of a game round showing infection risk and uncertainty information, the worker and coins (internal tasks) inside the barn, the shower facility
(blue arrow) and the emergency exit (red arrow), and the paths taken to attend to outside tasks. During each round, participants collect coins within the barn, then
receive a cue to complete an outside task. The participant would then make a decision to use the shower facility or the emergency exit to complete the outside task
based on the information provided. After completing the outside task (by touching the outside task space), the participant would return to the barn and collect more
coins before the end of the working day.
were followed for an experiment using human participants
(University of Vermont IRB # CHRBSS-15-319-IRB).
Experimental Design and Development
The serious game platform used to run both experiments was
developed using Unity software (Figure 1) (Unity Technologies,
Version 5.3.5f1). Participants acted as workers in a simulated
swine production facility and were confronted with experimental
treatments that differed by the risk of infection if they broke
protocol and exited through the emergency exit, and the
information presented to them about the infection risk. Each
round of the serious game represented one work day from 9 am
to 5 pm. Both experiments included 24 rounds of play in addition
to one practice round before the start of incentivized play.
The virtual farm worker was controlled by the participant
using the arrow keys on a computer keyboard. Each round began
with the virtual worker inside the barn, with tasks inside the barn
represented as spinning coins; when the worker was moved to
a coin the participant earned one experimental dollar. Spinning
coins appeared at a rate of one coin every 2 s. One time during
each round a high-value outside task would appear: either a
feed jam in the silo, a break in the water pipe, or the arrival
of a delivery truck. Attending to these outside tasks earned the
participant experimental dollars, depending on how quickly they
accomplished them. Each of these external tasks started out with
a $30 value that decayed by $1 each second. To earn experimental
dollars from these high-value tasks, the player needed to leave the
barn, and this involved the primary decision in the game: whether
or not to use the “shower in—shower out” biosecurity practice.
To use the shower biosecurity practice, the virtual farmworker
would enter the shower facility, activating a 5 s counter that
simulated showering and changing clothes. Then the participant
could exit the facility to attend to the task. The procedure would
repeat upon their return to the barn; shower again (which took
another 5 s), and then re-enter the facility. The decision to not
comply with the biosecurity practice involved leaving through an
emergency exit, which had no delay and no opportunity cost, but
risked infection. The opportunity cost associated with complying
with the shower process was estimated at $7.50 because of the
time lost getting to the outside task and the loss of internal task
coins during the return to the facility.
In both experiments, if participants chose to use the
emergency exit instead of the shower in—shower out facility, they
would reduce potential opportunity costs but risk direct losses
because their animals could become infected. Infections resulted
from a random draw, with the actual risk of infection quantified
using the expected risk of infection information presented to the
participant. With an infection, the participant’s animals would
“die,” the round would immediately end, and they would lose $50
experimental dollars and any accrued earnings from that round.
If their pigs did not get infected, they continued play until the end
of the workday.
When the round ended, the number of experimental
dollars earned was displayed on the participant’s screen. After
completing 24 experimental rounds, participants answered a
few survey questions, and then were shown a completion
code and the amount of real money they had earned. In
Experiment One, the conversion rate between experimental and
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FIGURE 2 | A threat gauge message format was used in Experiment Two’s
graphical message delivery treatments.
TABLE 1 | Experiment one treatments.
Treatment N
Infection Risk: 5% (Low) 944 (8 rounds*118 participants)
Infection Risk: 15% (Medium) 944 (8 rounds*118 participants)
Infection Risk: 25% (High) 944 (8 rounds*118 participants)
Uncertainty Treatment: Diagnosis
Certainty: “100% Certain”
1,416 (12 rounds *118 participants)
Uncertainty Treatment: Diagnosis
Uncertainty: “70% Certain”
1,416 (12 rounds *118 participants)
Message Delivery Method: Numeric: “1%,”
“15%,” or “25%”
1,416 (12 rounds *118 participants)
Message Delivery Method: Linguistic:
“Low,” “Medium,” or “High”
1,416 (12 rounds*118 participants)
real dollars was $35 experimental dollars to $1U.S. Participants
then showed their screen to one of the researchers and were
paid. In Experiment Two, the conversion rate was either $35
experimental dollars to $1U.S. for all in-person mediated games
or $350 experimental dollars to $1U.S. plus a base pay of $3.00
for Amazon Mechanical Turk Participants.
Treatments and Variables
Early discussions with industry stakeholders highlighted that
biosecurity was not simply a product of infrastructure and
protocols, rather it was a product of infrastructure, protocols, and
human behavior associated with willingness to use and comply
with biosecurity protocols. Treatments were designed to test
factors shown to influence willingness to comply, such as risk
of loss, information uncertainty, and the media type used to
deliver the message. In serious game play, participants received
information estimating the infection risk and the uncertainty of
that infection risk at the start of each round (Figure 2; Tables 1,
2). The infection risk information is used by the participant to
either accept the risk by using the emergency exit, or accept the
opportunity costs associated with the decision to use the shower
exit. The infection risk message was delivered numerically (e.g.,
“5%” infection risk), linguistically (e.g., “low” infection risk), or
graphically (i.e., using a threat gauge, Experiment Two only).
In Experiment One, participants received the Uncertainty
Treatment in the form of a message describing the confidence
TABLE 2 | Experiment two treatments.
Treatment N
Infection Risk: 1% (Very Low) 1,068 (6 rounds*178 participants)
Infection Risk: 5% (Low) 1,068 (6 rounds*178 participants)
Infection Risk: 15% (Medium) 1,068 (6 rounds*178 participants)
Infection Risk: 25% (High) 1,068 (6 rounds*178 participants)
Uncertainty Treatment: Contagion
Certainty (Single best estimate)
2,124 (12 rounds *177 participants)
Uncertainty Treatment: Contagion
Uncertainty (Best estimate plus a
range of potential values)
2,124 (12 rounds*177 participants)
Message Delivery Method: Numeric:
“1%,” “5%,” “15%,” or “25%”
2,124 (12 rounds*177 participants)
Message Delivery Method: Linguistic:
“Very Low,” “Low,” “Medium,” or
“High”
2,124 (12 rounds*177 participants)
Message Delivery Method: Graphical:
(A threat gauge with arrows used to
indicate risk)
2,124 (12 rounds*177 participants)
in the diagnosis of the infection risk: A farm worker stating
his level of certainty as either: “I have been working here for
30 years. I am 100% certain that there is an infection . . . ”
or “I just started working here. I am 70% certain that there
is an infection . . . ” While playing the round, the participant
could see information about the Uncertainty Treatment by
looking at a message displayed in the bottom right corner of the
screen reporting “Information Certainty: 70%” or “Information
Certainty: 100%” (Figure 1). Hereafter, this type of Uncertainty
Treatment is referred to as Diagnosis Uncertainty.
In Experiment Two, participants received the Uncertainty
Treatment using either a fixed level of infection risk or a variable
level of infection risk. The message the participant received noted
that the uncertainty was based on the understanding of the
disease threat: “There is a well-known disease in your system
with known contagion rates. There is a “low” probability of your
animals getting sick if you leave through the emergency exit.”
The following information was provided prior to starting each
round “There is a poorly understood disease in your system. The
best estimate is that there is a “low” probability (the probability
could range from “very low to medium”) of your animals getting
sick if you leave through the emergency exit.” As they were
playing the round, participants could check the information
about the Uncertainty Treatment through a display on the
bottom right information box on the game play screen (Figure 1).
Hereafter, this type of Uncertainty Treatment is referred to as
Contagion Uncertainty.
Uncertainty Treatment messages were displayed either
numerically (e.g., “1–15%”), linguistically (e.g., “low to high”)
or graphically using a threat gauge (Figure 2, Experiment
Two only).
In summary, after an initial examination of results from
Experiment One, we noted that there was not a treatment
that prompted a strong non-compliance signal (using the
emergency exit a strong majority of the time), and thus, we
decided to extend the treatment range in Experiment Two by
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adding an additional “Very Low” or 1% infection risk category.
Additionally, discussions with stakeholders and others suggested
the use of a graphical image to provide information was effective
means of information delivery, and thus we added a graphical,
threat gauge-style message delivery method. Thus, Experiment
Two had four infection risk treatments that varied from very low
(1%) to very high (25%) and three types of infection risk message
delivery (Numeric, Linguistic, and Graphical). Both experiments
had twoUncertainty Treatment categories related to the infection
risk information (Uncertain and Certain).
Three additional variables were used in these experiments.
First, because there were numerous rounds, we sought to control
for within-experiment learning or behavioral trends (48, 49),
and thus used a learning variable, referred to as Play Order,
to account for within-experiment changes, such as tendencies
to increase biosecurity as the experiment proceeded. Second,
we used psychological distance to look for behavioral changes
after participant’s facilities became infected. Third, in Experiment
Two, we used two different participant audience types. One
audience group performed the experiment with a moderator
present (from the Social Ecological Gaming and Simulation
Laboratory, University of Vermont). The other group performed
in the Amazon Mechanical Turks online environment (47).
Moderated participants received a higher cash payout than those
using the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. These differences
may have resulted in differences in salience between groups, and
thus, an Audience covariate was included in the analyses.
Analysis
A set of candidate models was developed to explain the decision
response by the participants. All candidate models were mixed-
effect logistic regressions models compiled using R statistical
software (50, 51). Candidate models included treatment variables
(Tables 1, 2), i.e., Infection Risk Treatments, Uncertainty
Treatments, and Message Delivery Treatments, and interaction
terms between treatments as well as the predictor variables: (1)
psychological distance, (2) the learning variable: play order, and
(3) in Experiment Two only Audience type. Participant was
considered a random effect. Parameter estimation from mixed-
effect binary logistic regressions are presented as logit coefficients
that can be used to predict the probability (from 0 to 1) of a binary
response, in this case, the probability that the participant would
use the shower biosecurity facility given the combination of
treatment information provided in the particular scenario. Logit
coefficients can be exponentiated to generate odds ratios, which
provide a measure of the odds that an individual will choose
to use the shower biosecurity facility instead of the emergency
exit. With odds ratios, a 1:1 ratio, presented as the value 1,
indicates that there are even odds for the choice, and thus, if 1 is
included in the odds ratio confidence interval, it may be equally
possible that the participant will choose either the shower or the
emergence exit and indicates that the variable does not have a
significant signal.
One method to find the most parsimonious model when
the number of possible combinations of explanatory variables is
large is to create a set of plausible candidate models, and test
to see how well each of them explains the data. We used an
information-theoretic approach for candidate model selection
(52, 53). Candidate model selection methodology and results are
presented in Supplemental Material Appendix A.
RESULTS
Experiment One
Data were collected from 118 participants in Experiment One.
Fifty-four identified as female, 59 identified as male, and 5
choose not to identify with a gender. The mean age of the
participants was approximately 25.4 years old. Payouts for this
TABLE 3 | Results of the selected best fit, mixed-effect logistic regression model (Model 8; see Table S1) for Experiment One.
Parameter Odds Ratio Lower Bound Upper bound p-values
Intercept (Infection Risk @ 5%, Linguistic Message,
Diagnosis Certainty @ 70)
3.337 1.811 6.149 <0.001
Diagnosis Certainty @ 100 0.206 0.132 0.321 <0.001
Psychological Distance 0.516 0.345 0.774 0.001
Numeric Message 0.448 0.291 0.690 <0.001
Infection Risk @ 15% 4.342 2.662 7.083 <0.001
Infection Risk @ 25% 5.223 3.168 8.612 <0.001
Order of Play 1.009 0.994 1.025 0.231
Diagnosis Certainty @ 100 by Numeric Message 1.451 0.775 2.716 0.245
Numeric Message by Infection Risk @ 15% 0.565 0.294 1.084 0.086
Numeric Message by Infection Risk @ 25% 0.868 0.446 1.692 0.678
Diagnosis Certainty @ 100 by Infection Risk @ 15% 8.152 3.937 16.883 <0.001
Diagnosis Certainty @ 100 by Infection Risk @ 25% 25.046 10.259 61.143 <0.001
Diagnosis Certainty @ 100 by Numeric Message by
Infection Risk @ 15%
0.332 0.128 0.861 0.023
Diagnosis Certainty @ 100 by Numeric Message by
Infection Risk @ 25%
0.451 0.147 1.389 0.166
Depicted here are the odds ratios for the fixed effects describing relationships with the binary response variable: compliance with the biosecurity protocol. Bold values indicate significance
at alpha = 0.05.
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experiment averaged approximately $28 with a $19 minimum
and a $37 maximum.
The AIC-selected best candidate model included Participant
as a random effect and the fixed effects Infection Risk, Diagnosis
Certainty, Message Delivery Method Psychological Distance
and Play Order, as well as all interaction terms between
Infection Risk, Diagnosis Certainty and Message Delivery
Method (Supplemental Material Appendix A).
Logistic regression results presented in both experiments
quantify the probability that a participant will comply with
the shower biosecurity practice instead of using the emergency
exit. Results presented in Table 3 are odds ratios. The top line
represents the baseline odds ratio associated with the treatment
combination of 5% Infection Risk, message delivered using a
Linguistic phrase and with the Uncertainty Treatment set at
70% diagnosis certainty. The 3.337 odds ratio presented on the
first line in Table 3 (intercept results) should be interpreted
as participants are 3.337 times as likely to use the shower
facility instead of using the emergency exit. The rest of Table 3
(i.e., excluding the top data line) are odds ratios compared
with the baseline, intercept ratio. Odds ratio values in the
table should be interpreted relative to the baseline treatment
combination, i.e., the intercept value. For example, participants
that received the infection risk information with a numeric
message instead of the intercept value (Linguistic) had an
odds ratio of 0.448, meaning they were 0.448 times more
likely to use the shower door than the emergency door (or
inversely 2.23 times more likely to use the emergency exit)
than if they received information about the infection risk
using a Linguistic phrase. If the odds ratio confidence interval
includes 1 then it is unclear if or how the predictor variable
will affect their decision to comply with the shower practice,
and thus, variables that do not have 1 included in their
confidence interval are significant variables. Odds ratios <1
indicate that it is relatively more likely that the participant
will choose to exit through the emergency exit, whereas values
above 1 indicate that they are more likely to comply with the
suggested biosecurity practice by using the shower in—shower
out door.
We found significant main effects, two-way interactions and
a three-way interaction between Message Delivery Method,
Infection Risk and Diagnosis Certainty (Figures 3, 4, Table 3).
FIGURE 3 | Summary results of the main treatment effects from Experiment One. Box-plot of the probability of using the shower biosecurity practice by the main
effects, Message Delivery Method, Uncertainty Treatment, and Infection Risk, Lower, and upper box boundaries 25 and 75th percentiles, respectively, line inside box
median, overlaid on model predicted data values.
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FIGURE 4 | Summary results of the interaction effects between treatments from Experiment One. Box-plot of the probability of using the shower biosecurity practice
by the interaction effects between Message Delivery Method, Uncertainty Treatment, and Infection Risk, Lower and upper box boundaries 25 and 75th percentiles,
respectively, line inside box median, overlaid on model predicted data values.
Main Effects (H1–H3)
Odds of compliance with the shower in-shower out biosecurity
practice increased significantly as infection risk increased from
5% (46.4% compliance) to 15% (75.7% compliance) to 25%
(93% compliance) (Figure 3 Right Panel). Shower use was much
higher when the risk message was a linguistic phrase (77.7%)
vs. numeric probability (62.3%) (Figure 3 Left Panel). Changing
the Uncertainty Treatment from an message received from
an advisor that was 70% certain of their report compared
to 100% certain of their report resulted in a relatively small
overall increase in the probability of observing participants using
the shower biosecurity practice (Uncertainty: 71.6%. Certainty:
68.3%. Figure 3 Center Panel).
Interaction Effects (H1–H3)
Significant interactions with infection risk and message delivery
type were observed (Tables 3, 4, Figure 4). The probability
that participants would comply with the shower biosecurity
depended upon the combination of treatments in the simulation
with compliance values ranging from 31.2% with the treatment
combination of 5% risk, message delivered numerically, and
with 100% diagnosis certainty, to very high overall compliance
when the message was delivered with certainty using a linguistic
phrase (98.1%).
Experiment Two
Of the 178 participants in Experiment Two, 76 were recruited
as in Experiment One and through on-campus workshops, and
102 were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turks. Ninety-
nine identified as male, 76 identified as female, and three chose
not to identify with a gender. The mean age of participants
in Experiment Two was approximately 30.3 years old. Payouts
for university community participants in Experiment Two
averaged approximately $27 with a $16 minimum and a $35
maximum. Amazon Mechanical Turk participants received
a base pay of $3.00 with additional performance bonuses
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5 Certain Linguistic 38.6
5 Certain Numeric 31.2
5 Uncertain Linguistic 65.8
5 Uncertain Numeric 50.0
15 Certain Linguistic 91.2
15 Certain Numeric 61.4
15 Uncertain Linguistic 84.9
15 Uncertain Numeric 65.4
25 Certain Linguistic 98.1
25 Certain Numeric 89.5
25 Uncertain Linguistic 87.5
25 Uncertain Numeric 76.3
Observed frequency of use of the shower in–shower out biosecurity practice.
ranging averaging $2.98, ranging from a minimum of $1.28 to
a maximum of $3.84.
The AIC-selected best candidate model for Experiment Two
included Participant as a random effect and the fixed effects
Infection Risk, Diagnosis Certainty, Message Delivery Method,
Psychological Distance and Audience, as well as the two-
way interaction terms between Infection Risk and Message
Delivery Method, and between Infection Risk and Contagion
Certainty. Model selection results and details can be found in
Supplemental Material Appendix A.
Main Effects (H1–H3)
As in Experiment One, odds ratios observed in Experiment
Two confirmed the hypotheses about the main treatment
effects (Table 5, Figure 5). Note that an odds ratio with a 95%
confidence interval excluding the value 1 is considered significant
with values <1 suggesting the odds of observing the shower
behavior are less than the intercept, while treatments with odds
ratio values above 1 are more likely to trigger compliance
behavior. Inference from the selected best candidate model
suggests that the use of the shower increased significantly as
infection risk increased from 1% (23% compliance) to 5% (59%
compliance) to 15% (85% compliance) and finally to 25% (93%
compliance; Figure 5, Right Panel). Contagion Uncertainty, i.e.,
being unsure of the risk of acquiring an infectious disease with
the use of the emergency exit, resulted in greater compliance with
the shower biosecurity practice (Contagion Uncertainty: 69%
compliance. Contagion Certainty: 62% compliance. Figure 5,
Center Panel). Use of a Graphic (i.e., a threat gauge) to deliver
the infection risk information message increased shower use over
both the Linguistic and Numeric messages (Graphical delivery:
72% compliance; Linguistic delivery 69% compliance; Numeric
delivery 60% compliance. Figure 5, Left Panel).
Interaction Affects (H1–H3)
Substantial variation can be explained by the main effects,
especially the infection risk treatment. Yet, the effects of
these effects become more pronounced when we control
for other variables in the system (Tables 5, 6, Figure 6).
Compliance ranged from 16.7% with the treatment combination
of 1% Infection Risk, message delivered numerically and with
certainty, to the most frequent compliance at 98.1% when the
Infection Risk was 25%, messages were delivered graphically and
with uncertainty.
Psychological Distance (H4)
In both experiments, evidence (odds ratios of 0.516 and
0.574 in Experiments One and Two, respectively), suggests
that individuals are modifying their behavior based on
the psychological distance by increasing the probability
that they will comply with the biosecurity practice after
becoming infected (Tables 3, 5). This was quantified by
the number of rounds since they last experienced the
economic consequences that results from their animal
becoming infected.
Learning Effect and Audience
In Experiment 1, the Play Order (learning) variable was
selected for inclusion in the AIC-selected best candidate
model, but it did not have support as a significant variable
in the model. This indicates that it explained some of the
variability in the data but did not have a consistent effect.
Order of play was not selected as an important variable in
Experiment Two.
A small difference in behavior was detected between
the different participant types with Amazon Mechanical
Turk participants taking more risks than participants
at in experiment moderated by personnel from the
Social Ecological Gaming and Simulation Laboratory
(Amazon Mechanical Turks, 62% compliance. Moderated
69% compliance).
DISCUSSION
Common risks faced in agriculture often relate to the safety
of the execution of tasks or the applications of products
or technology. Farmers make decisions regularly on how to
manage their farms, plants and animals and their risk perception
influences their decisions (18). Risk messages are common
and they aim at increasing awareness and/or understanding
about the level of risk and motivating a behavioral change that
reduces it.
The degree to which the risk information is received, its value
and usefulness is affected by many factors including how it is
framed and presented, and the recipient’s situation/context at
the delivery (54–58). In particular, the probabilistic dimension
of risk is challenging to grasp for the general public. One
line of research, inspired by risk communication theories,
shows that the type of message chosen to convey probabilistic
information (for example numeric, linguistic, graphical, or
visual) has an effect on the degree to which perceived risk
will change behavior (55, 56, 59). Overall, there is no one
specific suggestion on which message format is best (55). The
numeric format is precise and suggests scientific rigor but it
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TABLE 5 | Results of the selected best fit, mixed-effect logistic regression model (Model 2; see Table S2) for Experiment Two.
Parameter Odds ratio Lower bound Upper bound P-value
Intercept (Contagion Certainty, Infection Probability @
1%, and Graphical Message)
0.267 0.119 0.596 0.001
Contagion Uncertainty 1.173 0.795 1.732 0.421
Psychological Distance 0.574 0.339 0.970 0.038
Audience: SEGS Moderated 4.509 2.110 9.638 <0.001
Linguistic Message 0.365 0.208 0.639 <0.001
Numeric Message 0.270 0.156 0.468 <0.001
Infection Probability @ 5% 12.086 6.269 23.301 <0.001
Infection Probability @ 15% 352.507 144.614 859.261 <0.001
Infection Probability @ 25% 1571.303 438.113 5635.517 <0.001
Contagion Uncertainty by Infection Probability @ 5% 4.922 2.914 8.314 <0.001
Contagion Uncertainty by Infection Probability @ 15% 1.170 0.658 2.079 0.594
Contagion Uncertainty by Infection Probability @ 25% 1.010 0.500 2.040 0.977
Linguistic Message by Infection Probability @ 5% 1.040 0.493 2.193 0.918
Numeric message by Infection Probability @ 5% 0.399 0.196 0.816 0.012
Linguistic Message by Infection Probability @ 15% 0.934 0.355 2.463 0.891
Numeric message by Infection Probability @ 15% 0.196 0.079 0.489 <0.001
Linguistic Message by Infection Probability @ 25% 1.439 0.343 6.035 0.619
Numeric message by Infection Probability @ 25% 0.176 0.049 0.632 0.008
Depicted here are the odds ratios for the fixed effects describing relationships with the binary response variable: compliance with the biosecurity protocol. Bold values indicate significance
at alpha = 0.05.
may not connect with gut-level reactions in people who do not
have familiarity with methematical concepts (low numeracy).
The verbal format allows more fluid communication but it
might lack precision. Graphical and visual formats have become
common in conjunction with numeric or verbal risk messages
because they can encapsulate data, patterns, and matematical
relationships. The immediacy of graphical formats is very
appealing but it needs the right skills and/or information for
interpretation. Recomendations on how to improve messages of
risk probability are suggested in the paper reviews by Lipkus
(55) and Visschers et al. (56). Most reviews published on risk-
probability communication are in the medical field. The need for
guidance and research on effectively using risk messages in any
form (visual, graphic, linguistic or numerical) is growing. There
are still important questions about how to compose messages
for best efficacy in the farming context. With our experiment,
we aimed at understanding the effect of message type at the
operational level of biosecurity in the hog farming system. In
a recent publication, Merrill et al. (21) showed that the type
of information provided to inform about disease risk in a hog
production system affects the direction of behavioral change.
Specifically, information on disease presence lead to increased
investment in biosecurity. On the other hand, information
about neighbors’ biosecurity level triggered a free rider effect
in a significant fraction of individuals. Our current study is
therefore timely and essential to test and tailor risk messages
in the specific context of biosecurity compliance in livestock
production systems.
We examined effects of different aspects of infection risk
information and delivery on compliance with biosecurity
by testing for effects of disease infection risk, information
uncertainty, and message delivery methods. As hypothesized,
compliance with the biosecurity practice of using the shower
facility increased significantly with increasing disease infection
risk. With increased diagnosis and contagion uncertainty,
participants increased the frequency of their safe choices
(compliance with biosecurity). Graphical information
in the form of a threat gauge increased compliance
more than information delivered linguistically, with the
least use of the shower facility associated with infection
risk information delivered numerically. We also found
evidence of psychological distancing—the more time that
passed since participants experienced the consequences
of their animals getting a disease, the less compliant
they became.
Limitations
Social, psychological and behavioral economics studies
frequently use participants from a portion of society, such
as a student population, and attempt to extrapolate to a larger
or more diverse group. This could lead to bias if the participants
behave differently than the population of interest. Participants in
the present study were not recruited based on experience working
in swine production facilities and thus, participant behavior
may not accurately reflect worker behavior. For example, U.S.
farmers are thought to be relatively more risk seeking than the
general public (18). However, Zia et al. (60), using a similar
serious game methodology to study risk and information in the
swine industry, did not find a significant difference between
swine industry stakeholders and behavior of those not known to
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FIGURE 5 | Summary results of the main treatment effects from Experiment Two. Box-plot of the probability of using the shower biosecurity practice by the main
effects, Message Delivery Method, Uncertainty Treatment, and Infection Risk, Lower and upper box boundaries 25 and 75th percentiles, respectively, line inside box
median, overlaid on model predicted data values.
have any experience in the industry. Their conclusions should
be taken with some caution because their sample population of
∼100 participants may not have been large enough to detect
a difference in the behavior between populations. People are
complex and make decisions based on a number of rational and
irrational factors. Because of this complexity, true differences in
the decision process between population groups may be hard
to tease out. Moreover, experience will alter one’s heuristics but
may not do so consistently. Therefore, workers in the swine
production industry may behave differently than participants
selected for our study, yet because workers are complex and
each have their own set of objectives, any bias that exists
may not be consistent. In addition, we attempted to reduce
the potential for participant subset bias by using multiple,
distinct participant group types (i.e., Amazon Mechanical Turk
participants and the community recruited to participate on
the University of Vermont campus). Using multiple groups
allowed us to control for statistical differences among participant
groups and should reduce bias that may be associated with a
particular subset e.g., bias that could be generated if participants
were from only a student population. Although, data from
an all-worker participant population would be ideal, it is
logistically impractical and good evidence exists (60) that
behavioral differences between participant populations may
be minimal.
Infection Risk (H1)
The experiments were designed with PEDv in mind. The number
of hog facilities in the U.S. was estimated at 69,100 in 20112.
At the height of the PEDv outbreak in 2014, the number of
infected facilities reached over 1,200 (61), putting the probability
of infection at approximately 1.75%. This value is close to the
“very low” treatment in the present study, but when considered
as a series of choices over the course of a week, reflects that
the likelihood of an infection break per behavioral choice is
exceptionally low. However, in aggregate, many choices can
impact biosecurity and aggregate decisions may approximate the
1% treatment in Experiment Two.Moreover, for any given region
during an outbreak, the probability may approach much higher
2https://www.porkbusiness.com/article/usda-estimates-number-us-swine-
operations-farms
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1 Certainty Graphical 28.4
1 Certainty Linguistic 21.9
1 Certainty Numeric 16.7
1 Uncertainty Graphical 30.4
1 Uncertainty Linguistic 23.1
1 Uncertainty Numeric 17.8
5 Certainty Graphical 59.6
5 Certainty Linguistic 53.0
5 Certainty Numeric 30.0
5 Uncertainty Graphical 82.0
5 Uncertainty Linguistic 76.8
5 Uncertainty Numeric 54.4
15 Certainty Graphical 94.5
15 Certainty Linguistic 90.0
15 Certainty Numeric 66.1
15 Uncertainty Graphical 95.7
15 Uncertainty Linguistic 92.0
15 Uncertainty Numeric 70.6
25 Certainty Graphical 97.8
25 Certainty Linguistic 97.3
25 Certainty Numeric 83.9
25 Uncertainty Graphical 98.1
25 Uncertainty Linguistic 97.6
25 Uncertainty Numeric 85.6
Observed frequency of use of the shower in—shower out biosecurity practice.
numbers, which we reflect using our higher treatment levels of 15
to 25%.
Results of this study may extend for use in communicating
to farm workers, nudging behavior toward greater biosecurity
compliance, and thus, reducing their facility’s risk (8). By design
we varied the risk of infection if the participants chose to
exit through the emergency exit. In the high risk treatments,
we anticipated that most of the individuals would avoid risk
by complying with the suggested biosecurity practice and
conversely, we hypothesized that most would choose not to
comply in the low risk scenarios. As hypothesized, we found
significant jumps in compliance as the infection risk increased.
In Experiment One, less than half complied with the low (5%)
Infection Risk treatments, around ¾ complied with the medium
Infection Risk treatments and compliance approached 90% with
the high Infection Risk Treatments. After running Experiment
One, we recognized that we should include an additional very
low risk category to prompt evenmore non-compliance behavior.
Similar patterns were observed in Experiment Two with less
frequent compliance (around a ¼) in the very low, 1% Infection
Risk treatments, with an increase in the choice to use the
biosecurity practice (over half complied) as the risk of infection
increased to low, 5% Infection Risk treatments, about 85%
compliance with the medium, 15% Infection Risk Treatments,
and compliance over 90% with the high, 25% Infection Risk
treatment. The wide range of compliance observed by treatment
confirmed that our simulation was able to elicit a substantial
range of behaviors, and thus observe how the treatments
combined to observe emergent patterns of behavior. These
findings are supported by the risk aversion literature (33, 34, 44).
Infection Risk Uncertainty (H2)
Supporting previous research, we found evidence for an
uncertainty aversion effect in both experiments (62). Participants
were less apt to use the emergency exit to increase their
payouts if they believed that the information about the risk
associated with the behavior was uncertain. However, this
effect was not exceptionally pronounced as a main effect
because of the variation associated with infection risk and
message delivery format. However, when we examine uncertainty
when controlling for other variables, the effect is dramatic.
In Experiment One, when infection risk was set at 5%, and
message was delivered with certainty as the Linguistic phrase
“Low,” participants chose to use the shower biosecurity practice
38.6% of the time, and 65.8% when the infection risk message
was delivered with uncertainty, which marks over a 70%
increase in compliance associated with uncertainty aversion.
Similarly, in Experiment Two, with the Infection Risk at 5%, and
numerical message delivery, 30.0% complied with biosecurity
when infection risk information was certain, whereas 54.4%
complied when there was uncertainty about infection risk. So in
these two scenarios, by simply changing the level of certainty in
the infection risk information, we altered compliance from ∼1/3
probability of using the shower biosecurity to on average around
3/5 probability of compliance. These shifts suggest exceptional
uncertainty aversion constrained by situational risk (62, 63).
An exception to the uncertainty aversion effect appeared in
Experiment One, when significant infection risk prompted a
strong majority of participants to use the shower facility. In
this case, adding uncertainty slightly reduced the likelihood of
using the shower facility. This slight decrease may stem from the
wording that could have been interpreted to mean “I believe the
infection risk is high, but there is a chance it could be medium or
low.”With this interpretation, uncertainty in this situation would
produce a bias because the direction of uncertainty could only
reduce the probability of infection.
Message Delivery Format (H3)
Compliance with biosecurity protocols was observed more
frequently when the infection risk was conveyed using a
graphical representation (the threat gauge, Figure 2), followed
by messages delivered using a linguistic phrase, with the least
compliance when a numerical representation of the infection
risk (Tables 3, 5). The effect of message delivery format becomes
more pronounced when the other two treatment variables are
controlled. In Experiment One, we observed the most extreme
changes in behavior with the Infection Risk at 15%, and with
messages delivered with certainty, 91.2% of participants used
the shower biosecurity practice when the message was delivered
using the linguistic phrase “Medium Risk” contrasted with
61.4% when the risk message was delivered numerically as
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org 12 June 2019 | Volume 6 | Article 156
Merrill et al. Compliance With Biosecurity
FIGURE 6 | Summary results of the interaction effects between treatments from Experiment Two. Box-plot of the probability of using the shower biosecurity practice
by the interaction effects between Message Delivery Method, Uncertainty Treatment, and Infection Risk, Lower and upper box boundaries 25 and 75th percentiles,
respectively, line inside box median, overlaid on model predicted data values.
“15%.” In Experiment Two, we observed the most dramatic
behavioral shift associated with message delivery type with the
treatment combination of Infection Risk at 5%, and the message
delivered with certainty. With this treatment combination,
there was a 59.6% probability that participants would comply
when the message was delivered graphically, and a 30.0%
compliance rate when the message was delivered numerically.
These results corresponds well with previous research that
suggests using graphical representations of information for
efficient information transfer (42). Moreover, research has
noted that people are notoriously poor at calculating cost
loss functions using numerical probabilities (24, 44). Because
we requested quick decisions for each scenario, we suggest
that participants were using mental shortcuts to calculate
the if the risk was worth the potential benefit, and in the
high risk scenario the numeric risk was 25%. Compared to
100%, this value is relatively low, and experientially, many
may have quickly considered the likelihood of an infection
to be low without analytically assessing the relative benefit
and relative costs of their decision (25, 27). In this case,
there was a 75% chance of earning approximately an extra
$9 experimental dollars and a 25% chance of losing around
$80 experimental dollars. If participants had fully assessed
those terms, it is unlikely many would have chosen to use
the emergency exit. Moreover, Slovic et al. (25) suggest
that the feeling, or affect, behind a decision can sometimes
discount probabilities so that the decisions are made without
fully analyzing the values but rather simply by assessing
whether the decision “feels” risky. Thus, participants may
have observed the numeric “15%” or “25%” and intuitively
felt that the risk was low, and thus, made a gut decision
to exit through the emergency exit. The graphical image,
using a threat gauge, may have triggered an additional affect,
associated with risk and prompted additional constrain over
the simple linguistic phrase. These results reinforce the impact
of the method of message delivery, because many of our
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quick decisions rely on mental shortcuts, based on previous
experience (26, 27).
Psychological Distance (H4)
Historic exposure to an infection ties in with the concept
that humans use experientially-informed mental shortcuts to
help make decisions. The relationship with passage of time
and the influence of experience is captured in the concept
of psychological distance. In both experiments participants
that had just had animals infected because of their choice
to use the emergency exit were approximately twice as
likely to use the shower facility compared to those that
were nearing the end of the experiment and had not
experienced an infection. Thus, participants behaved with
increasingly risky behavior as time passed since they had
experienced an infection. This evidence for psychological
distancing (45, 46, 64) has profound education implications
for the industry because it reinforces the need for temporally
frequent reminders or messages, especially those messages
that support internalization of the material, explain the
problem and provide appropriate actions (65), as well as
assist in reduction of the discounting through reinforcement-
learning (66).
Selecting Appropriate Combinations for
Effective Messaging
As noted above, the combination of treatments could change
behavior from infrequent compliance to nearly ubiquitous
compliance. Even without altering the actual Infection Risk, the
rate of compliance with the shower in—shower out biosecurity
practice could be dramatically shifted with messaging. For
example, in Experiment One, with the treatment combination of
5% risk, numerical message delivery, and with 100% diagnosis
certainty, we observed that just under a third (31.2%) of the
participants complied by using the shower biosecurity practice.
Yet almost two-thirds (65.8%) of participants complied when the
message was delivered with uncertainty about the diagnosis and
with the message delivered using a linguistic phrase. Within the
subset of high infection risk treatments from Experiment One,
when the message was delivered numerically with uncertainty,
compliance was observed in ∼76% of trials, whereas if the
infection riskmessage was delivered using a linguistic phrase with
certainty, we observed approximately 98% compliance with the
shower biosecurity practice. This evidence suggests that we can
influence behavior through explicit message design and delivery
with the potential to radically change behavior, with an intended
goal of changing the default behavior and the culture within the
system (67).
Compliance with existing biosecurity practices is one of the
critical issues that confronts managers in the swine industry (8).
In August 2018, the authors were requested to run a workshop
for industry professionals to help assist in designing messages
to improve biosecurity compliance in their production system.
In light of this workshop, we recognize that compliance is
something that managers struggle with on a daily basis.
“I would be happy if I could get my guys to use soap.”–An
industry professional at a workshop titled Improving Workplace
Compliance Through Message Development. Minnesota,
August 2018.
Human behavior in the animal livestock industry remains
a challenge because of the serious ramifications of a disease
outbreak and the ongoing fight against complacency (8, 15). Here
we confirm that compliance with existing biosecurity measures
may be influenced by the way that we provide information
to those working in the facilities. Graphical messages that
make note of the inherent uncertainties rather than numeric
“best estimates” of the risk of contagion should provide the
most reliable compliance with existing biosecurity rules. If
graphical message delivery is not an option, our research
provides evidence that the use of linguistic phrases should
be encouraged over the use of numerical delivery. Costs for
biosecurity failures can be exceptionally high. In addition to
the direct costs associated with animal mortality and stunted
growth, owner operators and their workers can experience the
loss of livelihoods and even experience an array of mental health
issues. Awareness that psychological discounting temporally
(and likely spatially) will distract workers reinforces the idea
that biosecurity communication and trainings need to be
frequently reinforced.
CONCLUSION
As we have noted, the types of factors that influence the abilities
of farm workers to comply with biosecurity protocols like the
shower-in-shower-out facilities simulated in these experiments
are complex. Drawing on a number of factors that industry
leaders have highlighted for the researchers, three possible
influences were tested. The first is when the infection risk is
communicated, we see that the higher the risk, the stronger
the compliance.
The second influence is the level of certainty that the worker
has in the risk that their behavior may lead to an infection.
In Experiment One variations in this certainty as a matter of
both trust in the experiences of an experienced farmer (who is
100% certain of his forecast) and the less trustworthy experiences
of a new, less experienced farmer (who is only 70% certain
of his forecast). Operationally, we can interpret this as the
relative importance of the medium through which a risk message
is conveyed. Our results demonstrate that the assuredness of
information about the risk associated with behaviors may reduce
the rates of compliance with biosecurity protocols. In Experiment
Two, uncertainty was associated with epidemiological factors.
Regardless of the type of uncertainty, increased uncertainty
led to increased compliance. This result may seem counter-
intuitive. However, the selection of infection risks examined were
all relatively low from a pure probability perspective—at the
maximum, infection risk was 25%. In general, people tend to
discount the probability that something bad will happen if its
likelihood is low (44). When that probability is more certain, this
discount effect is more likely, because when a probability is less
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certain, the potential for even higher rates of probability are there,
leading to increased risk aversion (62, 63, 68).
Thirdly, these findings confirm that the method by which risk
is conveyed matters. Graphical displays are more effective than
linguistic, followed by numerical displays.
If findings are extended to the farm level, the operational and
policy implications from this study are summarized as follows.
If routine compliance with biosecurity protocols is desirable,
then one can expect significant variance in responses as risk
threat is communicated to farm workers. These findings suggest
that although risk communication is still likely very important,
the active and ongoing reporting of risk threat, regardless of
the medium (the assuredness of the messenger) and means of
communication are influential and should be considered with the
audience preferences in mind.
The findings of this project suggest that messages delivered
using graphical means to convey disease infection risk, include
infection risk uncertainty, and are delivered with relatively high
frequency to reduce the psychological distancing effect, have
the potential to dramatically improve biosecurity compliance on
livestock facilities. While we acknowledge that idiosyncrasies in
human nature will not disappear, we believe that even small
improvements in compliance can have a profound impact in the
reduction of disease, improving the welfare of animals and the
livelihoods of workers across this industry.
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